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Abstract
Background: Despite the use of a series of preventive measures, a high incidence of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) was observed among health care workers (HCWs) during the SARS
epidemic. This study aimed to determine which preventive measures may have been effective in
protecting HCWs from infection, and which were not effective.
Methods: A retrospective study was performed among 758 'frontline' health care workers who
cared for SARS patients at the Second Affiliated Hospital and the Third Affiliated Hospital of Sun
Yat-sen University. The HCWs with IgG against SARS and those without IgG against SARS were
respectively defined as the "case group" and the "control group", and logistic regression was
conducted to explore the risk factors for SARS infection in HCWs.
Results: After adjusting for age, gender, marital status, educational level, professional title, and the
department in which an individual worked, the results of a multivariate logistic regression analysis
indicated that incidence of SARS among HCWs was significantly and positively associated with:
performing tracheal intubations for SARS patients, methods used for air ventilation in wards,
avoiding face-to-face interaction with SARS patients, the number of pairs of gloves worn by HCWs,
and caring for serious SARS cases.
Conclusion: Some measures, particularly good air ventilation in SARS wards, may be effective in
minimizing or preventing SARS transmission among HCWs in hospitals.
Background
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a viral respira-
tory illness caused by the coronavirus SARS-CoV, was pos-
sibly the first globally significant occupational disease to
emerge in the 21st century, making healthcare work
potentially hazardous [1]. This was indicated by the high
incidence of SARS observed among health care workers
(HCWs) in the epidemic of SARS, especially during its ear-
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lier stages [2-5]. In China, from a total of 5323 SARS cases,
966 (over 18%) were HCWs, and in the early period of the
SARS epidemic, near 90% of the SARS patients were front-
line HCWs [6]. In Hong Kong, a total of 384 (22.1%) of
1739 suspected or confirmed SARS patients were hospital
workers [7]. Generally, SARS outbreaks first originated in
hospitals where SARS patients were treated and subse-
quently spread to communities from there [8,9].
Several studies indicated that HCWs coming into direct or
indirect contact with SARS patients in wards had a greatly
increased risk of contracting SARS-Cov, despite some strict
infection control measures being taken [7,10,11]. A simi-
lar situation also arose in the Second Affiliated Hospital
and the Third Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University
during the epidemic of SARS in 2003. A total of 846
HCWs worked on the frontline of caring for SARS patients
in the two affiliated hospitals and 112 of them contracted
SARS during this time. Throughout the whole period of
the SARS epidemic, a series of infection control and pro-
tective measures were employed in the two affiliated hos-
pitals. But, why were some of HCWs infected by SARS,
and some of them were not? The objective of this study
was to determine which preventive measures used were
effective in protecting HCWs from SARS, and which were
not effective. To answer this question, we conducted a ret-
rospective study of HCWs who worked at the frontline in
the two affiliated hospitals during the SARS epidemic.
Methods
Study population
In mid-May 2003, about 4 months after the initial SARS
outbreak in Guangzhou, a retrospective study was con-
ducted in HCWs working at the frontline of the SARS epi-
demic, providing primary care in the Second Affiliated
Hospital and the Third Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen
University, where the first and second outbreak of SARS
among HCWs occurred in the early stage of SARS epi-
demic in Guangzhou. Among a total of 846 frontline
HCWs who tended to SARS patients from the two hospi-
tals, 758 (89.2%) who were on duty during the investiga-
tion were surveyed, and they included HCWs from all
departments involved in the care of SARS patients in the
two hospitals. But, those who were off-duty during the
survey were excluded. During the SARS epidemic, a total
of 112 HCWs working on the frontline were diagnosed
suffering from "SARS" according to a case definition of
SARS by the Ministry of Health, China [12], and 90 of
them were successfully interviewed, giving a response rate
of 80.4% (90/112). Written informed consent was
obtained from all the participants prior to enrollment
after a detailed explanation of the study objectives and
requirements of the survey. The Ethical Committee of the
Sun Yat-sen University approved the study.
Definition of a SARS case
A SARS case was defined using the criteria for probable
SARS cases provided by the Health Ministry of China [12].
Criteria for probable and suspected SARS cases included
travel to a SARS epidemic area in the 2 weeks before the
onset of symptoms or close contact with a probable SARS
patient; fever of ≥ 38°C; chest x-ray abnormalities; normal
or decreased leukocycte count; and no response to treat-
ment by antimicrobial drugs.
In the present study, 10 mL of peripheral venous blood
was collected from all the subjects, and the serum was sep-
arated and stored at -70°C. Immunoglobulin (Ig) G
against SARS-CoV was detected using an enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) [13]. Among the 758 sur-
veyed HCWs, 91 ones (80 cases were diagnosed suffering
from "SARS" and 11 ones were not diagnosed suffering
from "SARS") had IgG antibodies against SARS, and the
prevalence rate of IgG antibodies against SARS was
12.01% for the total samples [13]. Furthermore, the prev-
alence of IgG antibodies against SARS-CoV was 88.9%
(80/90) for HCW with SARS [86.3% (63/73) in the Sec-
ond Affiliated Hospital and 100.0% (17/17) in the Third
Affiliated Hospital], and 1.6% (11/668) for HCW without
SARS who worked on frontline of SARS [2.8% (8/288) in
the Second Affiliated Hospital and 0.8% (3/380) in the
Third Affiliated Hospital] [13].
Data collection
A standardized interview with a structured questionnaire
was used to obtain the following information in mid-May
2003, about 4 months after the initial SARS outbreak in
Guangzhou. (1) Socio-demographic characteristics,
including: age, gender, marital status, educational level,
professional title, and in which department did you work?
(2) History of SARS patient care, including: i) Did you
receive any special training for how to handle SARS? ii)
Did you ever perform a tracheotomy? iii) Did you ever
perform tracheal intubations? iv) Did you ever care for
"Super Spreading SARS cases"? (3) Use of personal protec-
tive and control measures, including: i) How many gowns
did you wear while you cared for SARS patients? ii) How
many multilayered cotton masks did you wear while you
cared for SARS patients? iii) How many pairs of gloves did
you wear while you cared for SARS patients? iv) With what
frequency did you wear shoe covers while you cared for
SARS patients? vi) With what frequency did you wear a
cap while you cared for SARS patients? (vii) With what fre-
quency did you wear a face shield while you worked in
SARS wards? i) With what frequency did you wear goggles
while you performed operations on SARS patients? (4)
Health-related behaviors included: i) With what fre-
quency did you wash uncovered skin after you cared for
SARS patients? ii) With what frequency did you washBMC Public Health 2009, 9:81 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/81
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hands after you cared for SARS patients? iii) With what fre-
quency did you wash your nasal cavity after you cared for
SARS patients? iv) With what frequency did you wash
your mouth after you cared for SARS patients? (5) Other
relevant control measures were: i) What type of air venti-
lation system was used in your office and in SARS wards?
ii) What type of hand-washing equipment was used in
your office? More details about the name, definition and
value of these variables are listed in Table 1.
Data analysis
HCWs who had IgG against SARS (91 cases = 80 cases with
SARS and 11 cases without SARS) and those without both
IgG against SARS and SARS (657 cases) were defined as
the "case group" and "control group", respectively. 10
HCWs had been previously diagnosed as SARS, but their
IgG against SARS test was negative, so that they were
excluded from the data analysis. Logistic regression was
conducted to explore the risk factors for SARS infection
among HCWs and odd ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence
intervals were used to assess the association of SARS infec-
tion with the factors studied. Univariate analysis was per-
formed at first for each risk factor. Factors with P < 0.1
were included in a multivariate logistic regression analysis
and analyzed using a forward-stepwise procedure. In the
multivariate logistic regression analysis, age, gender, mar-
ital status, educational level, professional title, and the
department in which the HCW worked were controlled as
potential confounding factors. The entry and exit criteria
were set at P = 0.05 and P = 0.10, respectively. List-wise
deletion was used in the multivariate analyses. All the P
values were two-tailed, and a P < 0.05 value was consid-
ered statistically significant, unless otherwise mentioned.
All the statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 11.0
for Windows [14].
Table 1: Variables and definition
Variable name Definition
Socio-demographics
Age Year
Gender 1 = Male, 2 = Female
Marital status 1 = Unmarried, 2 = Married, 3 = Others
Educational level 1 = Senior school, 2 = Technical secondary school, 3 = Junior college, 4 
= university, 5 = Master degree, 6 = PhD
Professional title 1 = Doctor, 2 = Nurse, 3 = Health attendant, 4 = Technician in 
laboratory, 5 = Others
Department 1 = SARS ward, 2 = Emergency department/Fever clinic, 3 = Infectious 
disease, 4 = Respiratory disease, 5 = Others
Use of personal protective and control measures
Number of gowns worn 0 = Single, 1 = Double
Number of multilayered cotton mask worn 0 = Single, 1 = Double
Number of pairs of gloves worn 0 = Single, 1 = double
Frequency of wearing shoe cover 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Every time
Frequency of wearing cap 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Every time
Frequency of face shield in SARS ward 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Every time
Frequency of wearing goggles while performing operation for SARS 
patients
0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Every time
Health-related behaviors
Frequency of washing uncovered skin after caring for SARS patients 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Every time
Frequency of washing hands after caring for SARS patients 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Every time
Frequency of washing nasal cavity after caring for SARS patients 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Every time
Frequency of washing oral cavity after caring for SARS patients 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Every time
SARS patient care
Special training for SARS 0 = No, 1 = Yes
Performing tracheotomy 0 = No, 1 = Yes
Performing tracheal intubations 0 = No, 1 = Yes
Caring for "Super Spreading Patient" 0 = No, 1 = Yes
Avoiding face to face while caring for patient 0 = Never, 1 = Sometimes, 2 = Often, 3 = Every time
Other relevant control measures
Method of air ventilation in offices and SARS wards 1 = Artificial central ventilation (windows were closed in wards), 2 = 
Natural ventilation (windows were opened in wards), 3 = Natural 
ventilation and additional electronic exhaust fan (windows were opened 
in wards, at the same time, electronic exhaust fans were used for 
improving air circulation in wards)
Type of equipment for washing hands 1 = Automatic tap, 2 = Non-automatic tap, 3 = OthersBMC Public Health 2009, 9:81 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/81
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Results
Socio-demographic characteristic of the surveyed subjects
Table 2 presents general information about the surveyed
subjects provided by the two affiliated hospitals.
Logistic regression analysis
Table 3 presents the results of univariate logistic regres-
sion analysis. Among the eighteen surveyed risk factors,
fifteen factors were significantly associated with SARS
infection in HCWs, with the exceptions being "Frequency
of wearing face shield in SARS ward", "Frequency of wash-
ing hands after caring for SARS patients", and "Frequency
of washing nasal cavity after caring for SARS patients". See
Table 3.
After adjusting for age, gender, marital status, educational
level, professional title, and the department in which the
individual worked, a multivariate logistic regression
model identified five variables associated with altered risk
of contracting SARS at a significance level of 0.05 (Table
4). They were: performing tracheal intubations for SARS
patients, insufficient methods used for air ventilation in
wards, avoiding face-to-face interaction while caring for
SARS patients, the number of pairs of gloves worn by the
HCW, and caring for "Super Spreading SARS Cases". The
result of the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit for the
model was: χ2 = 4.739, df = 7, and P > 0.05.
Performing tracheal intubation for SARS patients and car-
ing for "Super Spreading SARS Cases" significantly
increased the risk of SARS infection among HCWs work-
ing on the frontline. In contrast, wearing multiple (2)
pairs of gloves could protect HCWs from SARS infection.
Compared with wards with artificial central ventilation,
those with natural ventilation or with both natural venti-
lation and electronic exhaust fans at the same time signif-
icantly decreased the probability of HCWs being infected
with SARS-CoV. A much lower incidence rate of SARS was
found among HCWs who either usually or consistently
avoided face-to-face contact with SARS patients in their
care.
Table 2: Socio-demographic characteristics of HCWs in the two affiliated hospitals
Second Affiliated Hospital Third Affiliated Hospital
Socio-demographic characteristics No. % No. %
Age (years)
<26 152 42.1 113 28.5
26~30 83 23.0 126 31.7
31~35 59 16.3 67 16.9
36~40 37 10.3 39 9.8
>40 30 8.3 52 13.1
Gender
Male 80 22.2 101 25.5
Female 281 77.8 295 74.5
Marital status
Unmarried 209 57.9 172 43.3
Married 147 40.7 213 53.7
Others 5 1.4 12 3.0
Educational level
Senior school 17 4.7 46 11.6
Technical secondary school 157 43.5 138 34.8
Junior college 58 16.1 72 18.1
University 74 20.5 43 10.8
MD/PhD 55 15.2 98 24.7
Department
SARS ward 227 68.2 111 33.8
Emergency department/Fever clinic 25 7.5 52 15.9
Infectious disease department 5 1.5 120 36.6
Respiratory diseases department 42 12.6 15 4.6
Others 34 10.2 30 9.1
Professional title
Doctor 105 29.1 134 33.8
Nurse 199 55.1 174 43.8
Health attendant 15 4.2 40 10.1
Technician in laboratory 25 6.9 13 3.3
Others 17 4.7 36 9.1BMC Public Health 2009, 9:81 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/81
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Table 3: Univariate logistic regression analysis
Risk factors SARS case Control OR (95% CI) P value
Number of gowns worn Single 42 189 2.12 (1.36~3.31) <0.001
Double 49 468
Number of multilayered cotton mask Single 32 116 2.53 (1.57~4.07) <0.001
Worn Double 59 541
Number of pairs of gloves worn Single 81 400 5.20 (2.65~10.23) <0.001
Double 10 257
Frequency of wearing shoe cover Never 55 237 3.80 (2.24~6.45) <0.001
Sometimes 8 26 5.04 (2.04~12.48) <0.001
Often 7 50 2.29 (0.93~5.67) >0.05
Every time 21 344 1.00
Frequency of wearing cap Never 68 380 1.79 (1.03~3.10) <0.05
Sometimes 3 63 0.48 (0.14~1.67) >0.05
Often 2 34 0.59 (0.13~2.65) >0.05
Every time 18 180 1.00
Frequency of wearing face shield in  Never 89 506 4.05 (0.54~30.34) >0.05
SARS ward Sometimes 1 107 0.22 (0.01~3.56) >0.05
Often 0 21 --- ---
Every time 1 23 1.00
Frequency of wearing goggles while  Never 88 483 7.83 (1.07~57.63) <0.05
performing operation for SARS patients Sometimes 2 103 0.84 (0.07~9.45) >0.05
Often 0 28 --- ---
Every time 1 43 1.00
Frequency of washing uncovered skin Never 62 339 3.29 (1.29~8.43) <0.05
after caring for SARS patients Sometimes 17 142 2.16 (0.77~6.05) >0.05
Often 7 86 1.47 (0.45~4.79) >0.05
Every time 5 90 1.00
Frequency of washing hands after caring Never 23 186 0.89 (0.52~1.51) >0.05
for SARS patients Sometimes 5 35 1.03 (0.38~2.75) >0.05
Often 18 113 1.14 (0.64~2.06) >0.05
Every time 45 323 1.00
Frequency of washing nasal cavity after Never 66 398 3.21 (0.98~10.53) >0.05
caring for SARS patients Sometimes 20 154 2.51 (0.72~8.77) >0.05
Often 2 47 0.82 (0.13~5.13) >0.05
Every time 3 58 1.00
Frequency of washing oral cavity after Never 69 376 3.26 (1.15~9.21) <0.05
caring for SARS patients Sometimes 17 147 2.05 (0.67~6.33) >0.05
Often 1 63 0.28 (0.03~2.59) >0.05
Every time 4 71 1.00
Special training for SARS No 74 421 2.44 (1.41~4.23) <0.001
Yes 17 236
Performing tracheotomy Yes 6 11 4.15 (1.50~11.50) <0.01
No 85 646
Performing tracheal intubations Yes 16 17 8.03 (3.90~16.56) <0.001
No 75 640
Caring for "Super Spreading Patient " Yes 69 268 4.55 (2.75~7.54) <0.001
No 22 389
Avoiding face to face while caring for  Never 40 182 1.00
patient Sometimes 23 200 0.64 (0.36~1.10) >0.05
Often 24 173 0.53 (0.31~0.93) <0.05
Every time 4 113 0.16 (0.06~0.46) <0.001
Method of air ventilation in offices and  ACV 20 295 1.00
SARS wards NV 54 333 0.28 (0.14~0.54) <0.001
NVEEF 17 29 0.17 (0.06~0.25) <0.001
Type of equipment for washing hands AT 5 125 1.00
NAT 85 509 4.18 (1.66~10.51) <0.001
Others 1 23 1.09 (0.12~9.74) >0.05
ACV: Artificial central ventilation; NV: Natural ventilation; NVEEF: Natural ventilation and additional electronic exhaust fan; AT: Automatic tap; 
NAT: Non-automatic tapBMC Public Health 2009, 9:81 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/81
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Discussion
It was hypothesized that performing certain high-risk pro-
cedures, such as nasopharyngeal aspiration, bronchos-
copy, endotracheal intubation, airway suction, and
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, might increase the rate of
SARS-Cov shedding occurring in a SARS patient's respira-
tory secretions, thereby increasing the risk to HCWs of
contracting SARS while performing such procedures [15].
The results of the present study demonstrate that perform-
ing tracheal intubations was highly associated with inci-
dence of SARS among HCWs. Therefore, the results imply
that adequate personal protective equipment is required
when conducting certain high-risk procedures which may
contribute to the presence of infectious droplets in the
environment.
It was hypothesized that the primary mode of SARS trans-
mission was via droplets spread through close person-to-
person contact [1], and this was strongly supported by the
occurrence of clusters of cases among HCWs caring for
SARS patients and family members of SARS patients
[16,17]. In the present study, we found that avoiding face-
to-face contact with SARS patients while caring for them
could significantly reduce the probability of HCWs con-
tracting the virus. This may be due to decreased exposure
to infected droplets resulting from this practice. This result
implies that HCWs could use appropriate personal protec-
tive measures (such as avoiding face-to-face contact with
SARS patients) to protect themselves from SARS infection
while they are caring for patients with SARS.
There is some evidence that longer range airborne trans-
mission may have played a role in the spread of the SARS
virus in some settings, such as in the outbreak of SARS in
wards with faulty ventilation in the Prince of Wales Hos-
pital of Hong Kong [17], in the transmission of SARS on
an aircraft [18], and in the community outbreak at Amoy
Gardens in Hong Kong [19]. The results of the present
study also indicate that airborne transmission might have
been a contributing factor in spread of SARS in 2003.
Compared with ventilation through artificial central air-
conditioners in the wards, natural ventilation alone and
natural ventilation enhanced by an additional electronic
exhaust fan at the same time could significantly reduce the
risk of HCWs contracting SARS in the wards. In wards with
artificial central ventilation, windows were closed which
might lead to much lower air flow and much higher viral
load in the wards, and HCWs were easily infected with the
SARS virus while working in such an environment. By
contrast, the windows of wards with natural ventilation
and natural ventilation enhanced by an additional elec-
tronic exhaust fans were opened, and the air flow and the
exchange rate of air in the wards were high, which might
greatly decrease the density of the SARS virus in the wards
and may also reduce the probability of HCWs contracting
the virus.
SARS-Cov may be shed from a SARS patient's respiratory
secretion and feces, and the latter may further contami-
nate objects in the ward. The protective gown, gloves,
multilayered cotton mask, and head and foot coverings
wore by HCWs may also be contaminated while caring for
SARS patients. It has been shown that SARS-Cov may
remain viable for considerable periods on a dry surface
(up to 24 hours) [16] and is stable in feces and urine at
room temperature for at least 1 to 2 days and 4 days in
stool from patients with diarrhea [19]. Hence, touching
surfaces or objects that are contaminated with SARS-CoV
may introduce the virus into the mucous membranes of
the eye, nose, or possibly the mouth. It is believed that
nominally 'clean' areas may be contaminated if an HCW
wears a piece of protective clothing contaminated with
SARS patients' secretions into the area. For this reason,
HCWs must wear two layers of gown, gloves, multilayered
cotton mask, head and foot covering in SARS wards and
discard the outer layer before entering clean areas, in order
to prevent fomite transmission to other areas [20]. This
study proved that wearing two layers of gloves signifi-
Table 4: Multivariate logistic regression analysis
Risk factors OR (95% CI) P value
Caring for "Super Spreading Patient" (No = 0: yes = 1) 3.57(1.94~6.57) <0.001
Avoiding face to face contact while caring for SARS patients
Never 1.00
Sometimes 0.67(0.36~1.24) >0.05
Often 0.30(0.10~0.90) <0.05
Every time 0.30(0.15~0.60) <0.001
Number of pairs of gloves worn (Double = 0: single = 1) 4.13(1.99~8.55) <0.001
Method of air ventilation in office and SARS ward
Artificial central ventilation 1.00
Natural ventilation 0.40(0.18~0.88) <0.05
Natural ventilation and additional electronic exhaust fan 0.27(0.16~0.63) <0.01
Performing tracheal intubations (No = 0: yes = 1) 2.76(1.16~6.53) <0.05BMC Public Health 2009, 9:81 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/81
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cantly protected HCWs from SARS compared with wear-
ing a single layer of gloves, but we did not find that
wearing double layers of gowns, multilayered cotton
masks, and head and foot coverings were associated with
HCWs being protected from SARS. This might be due to
the fact that almost of all the procedures involved in car-
ing for patients were done with the hands; hence gloves
were more highly contaminated by SARS patients' secre-
tions.
A small number of severely infected patients or super-
spreading patients appeared to play a disproportionate
role in the spread of the disease to HCWs. For instance,
several clusters of SARS outbreaks in hospitals can be
t r a c e d  t o  s u c h  p a t i e n t s  i n  H o n g  K o n g ,  S i n g a p o r e ,  a n d
Toronto [2,4,5]. It had been hypothesized that these
patients might have a relatively depressed immune system
with associated high viral loads and may be unduly facil-
itating transmission of the virus. In the present study, the
same index patient led to the two clusters of SARS out-
breaks among HCWs in the two affiliated hospitals. Statis-
tical analysis showed that caring for a "Super-spreading
Patient" significantly increased the risk of HCWs suffering
from SARS. In light of this, a series of stringent infection
control measures should be required when HCWs care for
patients suspected of being SARS super-spreaders.
Several limitations of the study ought to be mentioned
here. First, our investigation was limited to two affiliated
hospitals of Sun Yat-sen University. This is not represent-
ative of all of the hospitals in which patients with SARS
were admitted and cared for in Guangzhou. Therefore,
this is a typical case investigation. Second, ventilation in
the wards was not objectively assessed for some reason,
meaning that we could not exactly evaluate the influence
of the ventilation in the wards on the transmission of
SARS among HCWs. Third, we could not trace the tree
structure of the primary, secondary, and third class cases,
which prevented us from clarifying the association of the
HCWs infected by SARS with the index case directly or
indirectly. Fourth, some factors, such as oxygen therapy
and bi-level positive airway pressure ventilation were
found to be related to nosocomial infection of SARS in
other study [21], were not included in the present study,
which indicated that we missing an opportunity to find
some effective measures for protecting HCWs from SARS
or to assess their effect. Fifth, in the early stage of SARS epi-
demic, the diagnosis of SARS was based on the history of
epidemiology, signs and symptoms suggested by the
Health Ministry of China [12], not on the directive
biomarkers of SARS-CoV or antibodies against SARS-CoV,
which might lead to over reporting "SARS" cases or miss-
ing identifying inapparent infection or subclinical infec-
tion. This might be the reason that 80 of 90 HCWs with
"SARS" and 11 of 668 subjects without "SARS" were sero-
positive. Sixth, some prevention measures were usually
employed at the same time in SARS wards, which meant
that these measures were highly correlated. In this situa-
tion, multivariate statistical analysis might omit some
effective measures in the final model due to multicolline-
arity. Seventh, 10.8% of frontline HCWs who cared for
SRAS patients were not included in the present study,
which was the reason that the number of HCWs involved
in intubation in the present study was less than our previ-
ous study [13], which might cause to underestimate the
association of the intubation with the nosocomial infec-
tion of SARS. Finally, although we identified several pre-
ventive measures which were effective for protecting
HCWs from SARS, we could not eliminate the inefficien-
cies of other adopted measures, due to the fact that we uti-
lized a retrospective rather than an interventional study
design.
Conclusion
In summary, good air ventilation in wards and a series of
simple control and preventive measures might decrease or
prevent SARS transmission among HCWs in hospitals.
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